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Chapter 2
WHAT DOES AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN
UNION MEAN FOR CROATIA? 
Ana-Maria Boromisa
Croatian Energy Regulatory Council*
Zagreb
ABSTRACT 
Croatia missed the first wave of Eastern EU enlargementi, but it
is likely to start accession negotiations in 2005. It is gradually aligning
its legislation with the EU acquis pursuant to the Interim Agreementii.
Adjustment costs linked with the integration process coupled with the
lack of a firm timetable for full EU-integration might give rise to
euroscepticism, decrease readiness for reforms and slow them down.
Delays in reforms related to transition and integration can endanger
their effectiveness and impede development of the capacity to cope
with market forces within the EU. This is the economic membership
criterion. Hence, such developments can impede the fulfilment of EU
membership criteria and also reduce the potential for exploiting the
positive effects of integration.
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INTRODUCTION
The objective of the paper is to identify the major changes
caused by the first wave of Eastern EU enlargement and their impact on
the pace of Croatia’s integration into the EU. It also examines the
options for Croatian participation in the integration process in the peri-
od before full EU membership. 
First we analyse EU requirements and how the enlargement is
changing the level at which membership criteria are met. Next, we dis-
cuss the possible economic impacts of the enlargement on Croatia and
its ability to integrate into the EU market. In addition to the economic
aspects of enlargement, the paper identifies some of the institutional
and negotiating issues that should be taken into consideration when
revising the position of Croatia vis-à-vis the enlarged EU and the other
candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey).
Based on the analysis of these elements, we argue that the EU
enlargement will intensify the effects of Croatia’s associated EU mem-
bership. Associated membership causes alignment costs which could
prevail over benefits in the short run. Significant costs of the integra-
tion might give rise to euroscepticism and slow down the economic
reforms necessary for exploiting the positive effects of integration in
the medium to long term. Thus the establishment of association with
the EU, coupled with the EU enlargement process, might lead to a
slowing down of the integration process.
EUROPEAN UNION REQUIREMENTS
The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) says that any
European state that respects the principles common to the member
states (liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms and the rule of law) may apply to become a member of the
Union (Article 49). 
An applicant state can become a full member provided that the
EU membership criteria are met. These criteria are defined by the con-
clusions of the Copenhagen European Council (1993).iii Basically, the
candidate must meet political criteria (stability of institutions guaran-
teeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities), economic criteria (the existence of a func-
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tioning market economy, the ability to cope with competitive pressures
and market forces within the Union) and develop the ability to take on
the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of
political, economic and monetary union. This means that a candidate
must effectively apply the EU rules (adopt and implement the acquis)
and policies before membership. The EU, from its side, has to be ready
to receive new members. This means both that the EU’s financial per-
spective enables implementation of the EU policies if new member
states are included and that the EU’s institutions are able to admit rep-
resentatives of the new members into their work. Progress in negotia-
tions is conditional upon membership criteria being met.iv The neces-
sary reforms should be taken in the pre-accession period, which is the
reason why transition arrangements are limited in scope and duration. 
As the European Council has repeatedly declared, the member-
ship criteria are going to stay the same.v But since the EU is changing,
the benchmarks will change. Therefore we shall endeavor to identify
the most striking changes caused by the EU enlargement. 
Compliance with the political membership criteria has not
changed upon the enlargement.vi Meeting political criteria is necessary
for the progress of integration, but further economic integration is con-
ditional upon economic reforms.
Economic membership criteria require, first, the existence of a
market economy and second, the capacity to cope with competitive
pressures and market forces within the Union. The existence of a mar-
ket economy refers basically to the “domestic policies” in the candidate
country.vii The capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market
forces within the Union is changing as the relevant market (the EU mar-
ket) changes. It requires a minimum level of competitiveness in the
main economic sectors of the candidate country. The Commission eval-
uates compliance with the second economic criterion with respect to
various elements, among which are the extent to which government
policy and legislation influence competitiveness (trade policy, compe-
tition policy, state aid, support for SMEs) and the degree and pace of
trade integration a country achieves with the EU before enlargement
(volume and nature of goods already traded with member states). 
As concerns the requirement to take on other obligations of the
membership, enlargement is closely related to the internal development
of the EU. Therefore, the candidate has to accept institutional changes,
financial changes and policy reforms and align its domestic legislation
with the new acquis. Reforms induced by the EU enlargement are nec-
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essary for the functioning of the enlargement and for the development
of the ability of the EU to absorb new members in the next round(s) of
enlargement. For instance, new members had to align with the EU
acquis at the cut-off date of 30 September 2003 (European
Commission, 2004c:10). This cut-off date also applies to the finaliza-
tion of negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania, while countries that
have not started negotiations yet (Croatia) will have “more acquis” to
align with in the pre-accession period.
From the EU side, the capacity to absorb new members is high-
ly dependent on the success of the current enlargement process, a con-
stitutional agreement and the new financial perspective. Revisions of
the founding treaties agreed so far (TEU as well as draft Constitution,
COREPER, 2004) have set some principles in the decision making of
the EU, but have not provided answers as to how the institutions of the
EU will change in the next rounds of enlargement. 
EUROPEAN UNION REQUIREMENTS
AND THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS 
The inclusion of 10 new member states on 1st of May 2004
marked the biggest wave of enlargement in Union history. These coun-
tries have reached a sufficient degree of compliance with the member-
ship criteria, but alignment is not finished yet. There are still issues
requiring enhanced efforts and areas of serious concern. The latter
include areas affecting the internal market and those affecting the deliv-
ery of EU funds to beneficiaries in the new member states.
Bulgaria and Romania, candidates that have been included in
accession negotiations, but were unable to finish them on time, are con-
sidered to be a “part of the same inclusive and irreversible enlargement
process” (European Council, 2003). Their membership has been
rescheduled for 2007viii, which implies that they should sign the
Accession Treaty by the end of 2005 at the latest and complete negoti-
ations in the course of 2004. Since progress in negotiations is condi-
tional upon meeting membership criteria, Bulgaria and Romania had to
continue implementing necessary reforms. Bulgaria concluded acces-
sion negotiations in June 2004 (Bulgarian government, 2004). Romania
is well advanced and will continue negotiations on the same basis and
principles that applied to the ten new members. 
34
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Croatia’s compliance with membership criteria before the
enlargement was comparable with that of Bulgaria and Romania.
Shortly before enlargement, that is, the Commission published its
Opinion on the application of Croatia for membership of the EU
(European Commission, 2004a). The method followed in preparing
the Opinion was the same as that used in the Regular Reports. The
Commission confirmed that Croatia met the political criteria set by the
Copenhagen European Council (1993) and the Stabilisation and
Association Process (SAP) conditionalities. The SAP conditions most-
ly explain the political membership criteria on an individualized
basis.ix Bulgaria and Romania also comply with political criteria.
As regards economic criteria, Croatia is a functioning market
economy. It should be able to cope with competitive pressures and
market forces within the Union in the medium term, provided that it
continues implementing its reform program to remove remaining
weaknesses (European Commission, 2004a:53). Similar wording was
used in the latest Regular Reports for Bulgaria and Romania.
Croatia’s ability to take on the other obligations of membership
has been evaluated according to following indicators:
• the obligations set out in the Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA), particularly those already in force under the
Interim Agreement, which relate to areas such as the free movement
of goods, competition and intellectual and industrial property rights; 
• progress in adoption, implementation and enforcement of the acquis. 
The Commission concluded that Croatia will be in a position to
take on the other obligations of membership in the medium term, pro-
vided that considerable efforts are made to align the country’s legisla-
tion with the acquis and ensure its implementation and enforcement.
In Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania administrative and judicial capacity
need to be further improved to allow proper application of the acquis.
The quality of the legislation transposed in Romania has not always
been adequate, and revisions are called for making the situation com-
parable with that in Croatia.
Comparison of the Opinion and Regular Reports shows that the
Commission shares the view of the Government that it might be pos-
sible for Croatia to meet membership criteria in the medium term, as
planned by the Government. The main difference between the Regular
Reports for Bulgaria and Romania and the Opinion on Croatia is that
35
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in the Opinion the Commission stated that integration in the single
market and the adoption of the acquis would, at this stage, cause dif-
ficulties for a number of sectors, related to their ability to withstand the
competition within the single market. The Commission underlined that
addressing the identified weaknesses should contribute to higher
investment and growth, thereby enhancing Croatia’s competitiveness.
Such wording allows for inclusion of Croatia in the EU at a later
stage, and sets the ground for future opinions and Regular Reports that
might conclude that Croatia is not capable of meeting the second eco-
nomic criterion. 
However, a later inclusion in full membership should not be
regarded as indicating a deficiency in the Croatian economy. Namely,
in terms of the “usual” development criteria, such as GDP per capita,
energy consumption, life expectancy at birth, etc. Croatia is more
advanced than Bulgaria and Romania (for more see World Bank,
2004), which are considered to be part of the first round of Eastern EU
enlargement. Meeting EU membership criteria basically means a suc-
cessful end of the transition process (for more see EBRD, 2004) and
real convergence with the EU standards have been achieved. Hence,
meeting membership criteria can be regarded as a goal and not as a
condition for membership. 
IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT 
In this part of the paper we briefly estimate the impact of en-
largement on the fulfilment of membership criteria (which relate to
both the enlarged EU and Croatia), the impact of enlargement on the
Croatian economy and on the dynamics of Croatia’s integration into
the EU.
As identified earlier, enlargement changes the level to which a
candidate country is capable of facing competitive pressures and mar-
ket forces in the enlarged EU market, and the obligations of member-
ship change with the development of the EU (new policies, a new
acquis). From the EU’s side, its capacity to absorb new members de-
pends greatly on the development of new policies and the acquis.
Since the EU internal market is one of the major achievements
of the economic integration within the EU, in this paper we proxy eco-
nomic impact of enlargement on Croatian economy with the impact of
inclusion of 10 new members in the internal market.x
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Impact of enlargement on fulfilment
of membership criteria
Economic membership criteria 
As the EU expands, its internal market grows. The removal of
existing trade barriersxi between old and new members and among new
members increases the competitive pressures in the EU market, and by
doing so can have an impact on the level to which a candidate meets the
second economic membership criterion. These effects increase over
time, so the time dimension of evaluating compliance with membership
criteria becomes important. 
The effects of enlargement require some time span to material-
ize. That is, “negative integration”, whose effects can be seen in the
short run, has been achieved prior to enlargementxii. The period which
has elapsed since the enlargement is extremely short, so the impact of
enlargement cannot be evaluated on the basis its actual effects (ex-
post).xiii Consequently, we identify here the “statistical” changes
brought about the enlargement, which represent the new point of refer-
ence for estimating the “real” effects of enlargement (ex ante).xiv
We focus on two elements used as indicators for meeting the sec-
ond economic membership criterion: volume and nature of goods traded.
Firstly, after May 1st, trade with the EU means trade with 25
countries instead of 15, while CEFTA lost its most advanced members.
For Croatia, the impact of the enlargement (from EU-15 to EU-25) is
an increase in the proportion of its trade with the EU from under 60 to
over 70% of total trade (Table 1).
Table 1 “Statistical” impact of the European Union enlargement
on Croatian trade
Exports, in % Imports, in % Trade, in %
of total exports of total imports of total
EU-15 54.2 57.8 58.6
EU-25 67.6 72.5 72.8
Source: Boromisa (2004b)
Enlargement also caused a 10% increase of intra-EU trade and
9% decrease of extra-EU trade. Hence, one impact of enlargement is a
decrease in the external trade of the EU-25, but this effect on the EU is
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opposite to the effect on the individual trade partners. Hence, for
Croatia, enlargement has caused an increase in the volume of goods
traded with the EU.
Enlargement does not change the basic trade structure with the
EU (nature of goods traded). The most important export products to the
EU-15, identified at the level of 98 products according to the two-digit
combined nomenclature (CN) that denotes the statistical classification
of the EU were ships, clothing, electrical appliances and wood and
wooden products. Exports were highly dependent on ten products that
accounted for around 70% of the total Croatian exports to the EU-15.
Import structure was more diversified, and the 10 most important
import products accounted for around 60% of total imports. Export
structure to the EU-25 has not changed significantly. The top ten export
products according to the combined nomenclature remain the same, but
their ranking is slightly changed. Export specialization has decreased,
so instead of 71%, the top 10 products account for 67% of total
Croatian exports to the enlarged EU. Import structure has changed less
since the enlargement, and the top 10 products now account for 58% of
total imports, as compared to the previous 61 of total imports. 
Next, empirical research has shown that preparation for the sin-
gle market was accompanied by a decrease in the share of inter-indus-
try trade in Europe and a rise in intra-industry trade (European Co-
mmission, 1996). The same has happened in the candidates in the pre-
accession period. The pace of trade integration with the EU has been
highly positively correlated with EU changes in the export structure
(IMF, 2000; see also Boromisa and Mikiæ, 2003). Thus more vigorous
intra-industry trade implies lower specialization in different countries,
lower adjustment costs and roughly similar industrial structures. The
level of intra-industry trade between Croatia and EU has increased
since enlargement, which implies a higher level at which membership
criteria are being met.xv
Briefly, after enlargement Croatia is meeting the economic
membership criteria better, especially in the part relating to the volume
and nature of goods traded. 
Requirement to take on other obligations of membership 
Croatia will have to align with “more acquis” in the pre-acces-
sion period. This obligation could not be avoided if Croatia were a full
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member. However, the experience of the 10xvi new member states
shows that screening and compliance monitoring is in certain areas
deeper for “would-be” members than for members. For instance, the
comparison of the state aid scoreboard and policy reports containing
infringements (e.g. in the telecom sector) with Regular Reports show
that the “would-be” members have to comply with the rules more strict-
ly than member states.
Next, the EU launched some new policies and revised existing
ones during the process of the preparations for enlargement. These
include a revision of “internal” EU policies (such as the Common
Agricultural Policy, CAP) and policies towards third countries (the
Mediterranean countries, Russia, Ukraine, Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS) and transatlantic partners). Instruments of the pol-
icy towards neighboring countries include the creation of free trade
zones and cumulation of rules of origin. It is expected that by 2010 EU
will create a free-trade zone with Mediterranean countries in which
cumulation of rules of origin will apply. So when Croatia joins the EU,
it will have to allow free access to the domestic market from more
countries – not only the EU member states. It will also have to be able
to compete with competitive pressures in the market of member states,
which will be increased by the effects of enlargement and EU policies
– all (or almost all) neighboring countries will have free access to the
EU market. Also, liberalization of Croatian trade policy towards
Mediterranean countries and CIS will be one of the elements upon
which alignment with the EU rules and also compliance with the sec-
ond economic criterion will be assessed. 
Furthermore, the EU will develop some policies not directly
related to the enlargement. Croatia will have to adhere to them as well.
They might include some constitutional agreements, financial rules
(including issues such as budget and state aid) and competition policy
issues.
So in the pre-accession period Croatia will have to follow devel-
opments in the EU. However, in alignment with EU policies, caution is
needed. For experience has shown that Croatia’s membership in
CEFTA was too short to bring any benefits,xvii while the arrangements
achieved might be regarded as an obstacle in getting a “better deal”
with the EU in negotiating revisions of the SAA in order to take
account of the enlargement. That is, in order to take account of enlarge-
ment, some technical adjustments of the SAA were necessary. This led
to the new protocol of the SAA (Protocol No. 7) being negotiated. Its
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purpose is to adjust quotas to the enlarged EU. Technical adjustments
were seen by the EU as simple math – adding the quotas defined by free
trade agreements between Croatia and new member states to the quotas
defined by the SAA. Croatia asked for an increase of quotas for quan-
tities really imported from new members; quotas to CEFTA countries
were not fully used, and not even defined to some countries, since they
were not needed. Hence, technical adjustments, as seen by the EU,
would mean increased quotas that would be used by the old member
states and hence a further increase of Croatian imports from EU.
Finally, the EU is still developing, and can be considered as a
moving target. Enlargement creates the need for further reforms within
the EU and hence additional obligations of membership. However, it is
not yet possible to identify how the enlargement affects the speed and
direction of its movement. 
Capacity of enlarged European Union
to absorb new members
The enlargement from 15 to 25 underlines the need for defining
the EU from the inside by a Constitution and along its edges by the
adoption of a strategy on the wider Europe and the neighborhood. These
two issues can also shape the process of the enlargement in the future.
The financial framework for the next round of enlargement
depends on its size and coherence. Namely, the capacity of the EU to
take on new members depends on the capacity of the EU to manage and
finance its policies. Institutional arrangement depends on whether this
will be the last round, or some new rounds are likely to happen in the
near future. This is closely connected with the question of the borders
of Europe. According to the earlier mentioned Article 49 of the TEU,
further EU expansion awaits debate on the ultimate geographic limits
of the EU.xviii This is implicitly stated also by New Neighborhood
Policy of the EU (European Commission, 2003b) which recognises that
countries that currently do not have any perspective of membership in
the EU might have such a perspective at a later stage. Which countries
are “potential candidates” significantly influences capacity of the EU to
absorb new members, which is one of the Copenhagen criteria.
Institutional design for EU-28 (if Croatia is the only country in the next
round of enlargement, and Bulgaria and Romania are included as part
of this round of enlargement) is likely to be different from EU-29 (EU-
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25 + Bulgaria + Romania + Croatia + Turkey), or EU of some 35, most-
ly small states (SAP countries, which are at present potential candi-
dates: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Mon-
tenegro and Kosovo).xix
Next, it is difficult to predict whether EU-25 can work with its
present institutions. This makes the time horizon for future enlargements
more distant. The Constitution should facilitate the functioning of the
EU and enable subsequent enlargement(s). Without a constitutional
framework it will be quite difficult to reach an institutional agreement
on the participation of Croatian representatives in the EU institutions. 
This implies that based on the EU’s capacity to take on new
members there are two basic scenarios for inclusion of Croatia into the
EU. The first is the fast inclusion scenario based on an EU political
decision and does not provide a “regular” framework for the institution-
al design of the enlarged EU. It implies that Croatia will be the only
country included in the round of enlargement. Its size would allow the
granting of the same number of representatives to the EU institutions as
to countries of a similar size. However, this solution does not enable the
same approach for the subsequent rounds of enlargement, decreases the
credibility of the EU and indicates that votes of a small, individual
member basically do not matter. For if the inclusion of Croatia were to
decrease the power of some countries in decision-making, it would be
politically very difficult to achieve the needed unanimity. 
Therefore, we consider that the fast-track scenario is not very
likely. The more distant membership scenario is based on the presump-
tion that the “normal” institutional approach will be followed. This
implies that the EU will have to digest this enlargement first, so that the
next enlargement will not happen before a constitution is agreed upon
and ratified. 
The institutional package related to EU-accession can be nego-
tiated for Croatia alone, for Croatia and Turkey, possibly Macedonia
and other SAP countries. This does not imply that the whole “block” is
going to enter the EU in unison. However, it is likely that the EU will
design the institutional structure for SAP countries and Turkey in a
“package”. Namely, SAP countries are rather small, so their member-
ship can cause additional problems in voting, disturbing the balance
between big and small member states. 
Considering Turkey as an EU member state would probably be
of interest to the “big” countries, since their number and influence would
grow. On the other hand, an increased number of EU member states
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increases the need for harmonization of policies and negotiating posi-
tions, since the negotiating strength of each individual member state
decreases as the total number of member states increases (Table 2).
Table 2 Size of the European Union member states, Stabilisation and
Association Process countries and Turkey
Area Population GDP GDP (USD
(1000 km2) (mil) (billion USD) per capita)
Median Average Median Average Median Average
EU-15 132 216 10.0 25.3 251.6 594.9 21,192
New members 57 74 3.0 7.5 14.7 32.8 4,383
EU-25 79 159 9.0 18.2 13.1 370.1 18,392
SAP countries 51 53 4.2 5.0 4.4 7.7 1,537
Turkey 774 65.3 199.3 3,052
Source: Boromisa (2004b - based on World Bank data for 2000)
Table 2 illustrates how the average size of EU member states has
shrunk as a result of the enlargement. While the average EU-15 mem-
ber had a population of around 25 million and a GDP of almost 600 bil-
lion USD, the average member state of EU-25 has roughly 30% fewer
inhabitants (18 million) and a 38% smaller GDP (i.e. 370 billion USD).
For weighting the votes in the Council, the calculated median shows
more. While half of the EU-15 countries had populations of over 10
million, in EU-25 more than half have over 9 million, which decreases
the relative “weight” of the “big” countries. The SAP countries have
populations of 5 million on average (4.2 median), so their inclusion
would shift the balance further to the smaller countries. 
To sum up, enlargement of the EU decreases its capacity to
accept new members. The differences between the negotiating statuses
of the candidates are correlated with the capacity of the EU to absorb
them. In order to include representatives of new members in the EU
institutions, an agreement and a new intergovernmental conference are
needed. Hence, it would be more reasonable and efficient to initiate
such a procedure for more than just one small country.
Economic impact of the enlargement
The net economic impact of the first round of the Eastern
enlargement is expected to be small and positive (for more, see e.g.
42
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European Commission, 1997). The expected economic impact for the
new members should be large and positive. The impact on the old mem-
bers (EU-15) is expected to be limited. The GDP of the 10 new mem-
ber states amounts in total to approximately 4% of the GDP of EU-15
(Eurostat, 2004), which illustrates why the impact on the economies of
the EU-15 is expected to be marginal. 
The prevailing impact on third countries is also expected to be
limited, but unevenly distributed. It depends on the region, sector, as
well as the timing and success of measures aimed at alleviating possi-
ble negative impacts of enlargement-such as creation of free trade
zones, which is the main instrument of the SAP and New
Neighborhood Policy. The impact of enlargement is expected to be big-
ger in neighboring regions, and negative in traditional industries and
agriculture (for more about this see Gros, Crum and Turmann, 2004;
Bayar, 1998; Frandsen, Jensen and Vanzetti, 1998; European
Commission, 1997; Boromisa, 2004b).xx
Croatia is a neighboring economy, in which traditional indus-
tries are quite important. Hence, negative effects of enlargement can be
expected. On the other hand, the EU enlargement is taking place during
an extremely eventful period for Croatia: it has recently joined the
WTO, signed the SAA and regional free trade arrangements (with
CEFTA, EFTA and Western Balkans). These processes should help
alleviating possible negative effects of the EU enlargement.
Hence, to estimate whether these processes will have a positive
or negative effect some quantification is needed. Our quantification is
based on two analyses – on the level of the economy as a whole and a
sector-specific analysis. Both analyses, whose results are presented
below, quantify trade effects of the EU enlargement and establishment
of free trade zone with the EU. 
At the level of economy as a whole we first estimate the gener-
al trade effects of the EU enlargement, i.e. the impact of enlargement
on extra- and intra-EU trade. Next, we project the distribution and rel-
evance of these effects for Croatia. Third, we estimate the effects of the
establishment of a free trade zone with the enlarged EU. Finally we
estimate the prevailing effect of establishment of a free trade zone
between Croatia and the EU and the EU enlargement. 
Sector-specific analysis includes an estimate of the impact of
sector-specific trade barriers and an analysis of the position of
Croatian exporters on the market of old and new EU member states
based on several indices (e.g. revealed comparative advantages, terms
of trade, quality gap). 
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General trade effects of the enlargement are classified as trade
creation effect (increase of intra-EU trade) and trade diversion effect
(decrease of extra-EU trade). We estimated that the EU enlargement
could lead to increase of intra-EU trade (trade creation effect) 1.73%,
reference value being “statistical” intra-EU trade. Trade creation is
induced by elimination of trade barriers which create costs. We esti-
mated trade diversion, i.e. decrease of extra-EU trade, 0.18% of the
statistical value (for more see Boromisa 2004b). The results are in line
with other studies that show that the impact of enlargement is likely
to be limited (e.g. Baldwin, Francois and Portes, 1997; Keuschnigg
and Kohler, 1999; Lejour, Mooij and Nahuis, 2001). However, these
limited effects of enlargement might be very significant for Croatia,
due its size compared to the EU. This can be illustrated by the fact
that the estimated trade diversion effect (0.18% of statistical extra-EU
trade after enlargement) is equivalent to 40% of the total exports of
Croatia to EU-15. Hence, what is from the EU perspective a “small”
trade diversion effect can seriously jeopardize Croatian exporters.
Based on the decrease of trade costs within the EU we esti-
mate trade diversion effect of enlargement on Croatia as a 5.5%
decrease of Croatian exports to the EU. Decreased trade costs (and
prices) are expected to cause an increase of imports from the EU of
2.9%, the reference value being “statistical” exports and imports to
EU-25 (Table 3).
Using the same approach (decrease of trade costs between the
enlarged EU and Croatia) we estimate the impact of establishment of
free trade with the EU-25 on trade between Croatia and EU as a 8.5%
increase of imports and 2.5% of exports (Table 3). This result indi-
cates that enlargement will intensify the effects of the establishment
of a free trade zone. Previous research showed the establishment of
free trade zone will lead to an increase of exports to the EU-15 of ca
2%, and an increase of imports by ca 7-8% (Kersan-Škabiæ, 2001;
Samardija, Stanièiæ and Nikiæ, 2000; Madareviæ, Šonje and Jurlin,
1997). 
The estimated effects of enlargement and the establishment of
a free trade zone taken together show a further increase in the short-
term impact of the establishment of a free trade zone with the EU: the
expected prevailing effect is a 3% decrease of exports (compared with
statistical value of exports to EU-25) and an 11.4% increase of
imports from EU-25 (compared with statistical imports from EU-25),
as shown in Table 3.
44
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Table 3 Short-term trade effects of enlargement and implementation of the
Stabilization and Association Agreement on trade between Croatia
and EU-25. Estimate on the level of economy as a whole 
Enlargement impact SAA Total (impact of SAA
and the enlargement)
Export growth -5.5 2.5 -3.0
(reference value
statistical export) %
Import growth 2.9 8.5 11.4
(reference value
statistical import) %
Source: Boromisa (2004b)
This analysis shows that enlargement is likely to intensify the
effects of the establishment of a free trade zone and to increase the
adjustment costs. The establishment of a free trade zone will also cre-
ate the potential for exploiting better access to a bigger market. The
projected trade creation effect (1.73% of intra-EU trade) is a result of
increased demand in the new member states, which equals 9.5 times
Croatian exports to these countries, while increased demand in the EU-
15 is 1.05 times greater than Croatian exports to the EU-15. At the level
of EU-25 increased demand is 2.73 times greater than statistical export
to EU-25. Exploiting just a small part of this potential can have a sig-
nificant positive impact on Croatia’s trade balance and economy as a
whole, but exploiting this potential is limited by the Croatian produc-
tion and export structure. 
A sector specific analysis of Croatian economy shows that in
open sectors production structure corresponds to the export structurexxi.
However, this is not in line with the comparative advantages of
Croatian producers. Hence, we estimated (summarized results are pre-
sented in Table 4) that the prevailing impact of implementation of SAA
and the establishment of a free trade zone will lead to increased imports
from the enlarged EU, while integration within the EU will cause fierce
competition within the EU and some trade diversion that could be felt
by Croatian exporters.
It might be concluded that the potential for trade expansion
towards the enlarged EU for Croatian producers and exporters is in the
short-run limited by their production capacities, which do not corre-
spond with demand on the EU market.xxii Generally, demand for so-
phisticated products on the EU market is increasing, while difficulties
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can face producers of traditional products. Bearing in mind the Croatian
export structure (sectors that create 5% of GDP contribute to almost
60% exports and export oriented sectors are traditional ones – textile,
clothing, wood) it is likely that negative effects will prevail. This is the
result of slow structural changes in Croatia, which during the transition
period have been slower than in the new EU member states (IMF,
2000). The economic growth in Croatia in the transition period was
boosted by domestic consumption. Hence, liberalized access to the
Croatian domestic market, caused by implementation of SAA, is
increasing competitive pressure on the domestic market. In the enlarged
EU trade barriers between individual member states are being abol-
ished. This decreases trade costs and leads to increasing competitive
pressure on the EU market. EU enlargement and the establishment of a
free trade zone are increasing competitive pressures in the most impor-
tant markets for Croatian producers (domestic market and the EU mar-
ket), so in the short run significant adjustment costs are to be expected.
The results of the sector-specific analysis show that the obstacle to
keeping up exports to the (enlarged) EU is production (and export)
structure, and not the integration process as such.
Table 4 Sectoral estimates of short term trade effects of enlargement
and implementation of Stabilization and Association Agreement 
Enlargement impact SAA Total (impact of SAA
and the enlargement)
Export growth -8.5 3.0 -5.5
(reference value
statistical export) %
Import growth –* 7.9 7.9
(reference value
statistical import) %
* This estimate analyses the position of 98 products originating from Croatia on the EU
markets (divided into two parts-old member state and new member state markets) and of
products originating from these two markets in Croatia. The increases in imports from
old and new member states were estimated separately, because the trade barriers applied
by Croatia towards products deriving from the two separate groups were not the same.
Changes in Croatian trade barriers to goods originating in the old members can be
regarded as an effect of the implementation of the SAA, and changes with respect to tar-
iff barriers applied to the exports of new members a result of the alignment of free trade
agreements with the SAA. In order to make the comparison simple, the same reference
value, statistical imports from EU 25, was used. This is the reason why the effects have
been attributed to the implementation of the SAA.
Source: Boromisa (2004b)
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Restructuring is transition-related and should create conditions
for sustainable growth. Also, the adjustment costs can be regarded as a
preparation for inclusion into full membership, as building Croatia’s
capacity to cope with the competitive pressures of the internal market.
This requires that the underlying economic environment is favorable
and that the Croatian economy has flexibility and a sufficient level of
human and physical capital, including infrastructure. In their absence,
competitive pressures are likely to be considered too intense by some
groups of society (which are likely to be affected by adjustment costs)
and there might be a call for protective measures, which, if implement-
ed, would undermine the single market. This could be seen from the EU
side as a deficiency in meeting the second economic membership crite-
ria, so such issues should be dealt with in the short run.
Sensitivity analysis of basic presumptions shows that further
integration within the EU (like a further decrease of barriers within the
EU, resulting for instance, from the introduction of the euro), or change
of price elasticity towards products from third countries intensifies the
impacts of enlargement. A change of perception of the domestic (EU)
product also intensifies this effect, so in the longer run can make it more
difficult to sell on the EU market. 
On the other hand, the potential for exploiting the gains of inte-
gration (within the EU, e.g. for members, and towards the EU – e.g. for
third countries) should increase over time. Whether this potential will
actually be exploited depends on the capacity of firms and domestic insti-
tutions in the individual state and hence its own growth prospects. For a
small and open economy (such as Croatia) gradual integration with a
developed, neighboring and big economy (implementation of the SAA),
creates the potential for exploiting the positive effects of such arrange-
ment (Schiff and Winters, 1998). The potential for exploiting these posi-
tive effects of integration grows with the size of the integration. Hence,
such a potential is estimated to be greater towards the enlarged EU than
the potential estimated towards the EU-15 and CEFTA separately (more
about this see Kersan-Škabiæ, 2001; Boromisa, 2004b). 
Regional economic integration (with EU, CEFTA, Western
Balkans) and enhanced cooperation with Mediterranean countries and
CIS can help to make the adjustment costs tolerable and thus facilitate
integration into the EU market (through re-directing some exports to
these markets). However, this should be regarded as an accompanying
measure. Integration into the EU is, due its size, level of development,
geographic position and already established economic links with
Croatia, economically the best option.
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Next round(s) of enlargement
Croatia is likely to start accession negotiations in 2005, and will
probably meet membership criteria to be included in the second round
of Eastern enlargement. But it is not yet defined when this round will
take place and which countries will be included. 
So far, apart from Bulgaria and Romania, which are considered to
be a part of the first round of Eastern enlargement, there are only two can-
didates: Croatia and Turkey, while SAP countries are potential candidates. 
In December 2004 European Council concluded that Turkey
sufficiently fulfils Copenhagen political criteria to open accession
negotiations provided it brings into force specific pieces of legislation.
It invited Commission to prepare necessary framework proposals with
a view to opening negotiations on 3 October 2005 (European Council
2004b). Opening of negotiations, however, does not set the timeframe
for membership nor answers the remaining institutional, financial or
policy issues from the EU side. Experience from the first round of
Eastern enlargement shows that a later opening of negotiations does not
necessarily mean later membership (e.g. Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia). 
The next round(s) of the Eastern enlargement will be smaller
than the current expansion. The sheer size of the last round of enlarge-
ment, as compared with that in which Croatia is likely to be included,
shows that the EU will have much more capacity and experience to
monitor progress than it had in the previous enlargement round. 
The distant time horizon for full membership raises two issues
of general significance: first, how the EU can give sufficient substance
to the association process to keep it politically motivating, and second,
whether and how the EU constitution and institutions can be made
capable of absorbing many more small states, with the total rising
maybe to 30 or 35 member states (more about these issues see Emerson,
2002; 2003)? 
CASE OF CROATIA: WHAT SCENARIO
FOR THE FUTURE? 
Based on the extent to the commitment to Europe and on EU
political will, four alternative scenarios for the future integration
process, labeled as progression, regression, compression and secession
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could be envisaged (Table 5). They do not answer the basic question of
when Croatia is going to be included into the EU, but show the way that
is the fastest.
Table 5 Scenarios for the future
Croatia: extent of commitment to Europe
High Low
EU political will
High Progression Compression
Low Regression Secession
Source: According to Grimm (2004) 
The compression scenario is basic scenario, identified earlier as
distant membership scenario. Although the EU is willing to enlarge, the
movement to a Constitution and new institutional solutions remains
slow, the focus on regionalism and blocks is continued, accession nego-
tiations continue, while policy coherence remains distant. 
The progression scenario is based on the presumption that the
EU accepts (i.e. all member states ratify) the constitution and vigorous-
ly supports the integration process. The focus is shifted from regional-
ism and blocks, so the SAP is individualized. Croatia’s institutional
capacity is created and remaining difficulties are dealt with. 
In the regression scenario a consensus around greater
Europeanization is found, but negotiations falter. There is little support
for radical opening up of the EU. 
In the secession scenario lip service is paid to Europe, but in
practice no progress is made, financial perspective do not allow for fur-
ther enlargement, member states increasingly challenge the decisions
and orientations of the Commission, re-nationalising the EU is dis-
cussed, and bilateral agreements acquire more prominence.
By deciding to convene a bilateral intergovernmental confer-
ence with Croatia early in 2005 in order to begin negotiations, the
European Council confirmed the principle of eligibility for all
European democracies (European Council, 2004a). This can be regard-
ed as indicating a high level of EU political will, so the progression sce-
nario is possible if Croatia does its part. The progression scenario is not
the same as the fast inclusion scenario, which we mentioned earlier,
arguing that it is not very likely. Progression denotes the fastest possi-
ble, but it does not really mean fast (short run) membership in the EU.xxiii
Identifying the progression scenario with fast inclusion into the EU is
the result of insufficient understanding of EU procedures and policies.
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Confusing the progression with the fast inclusion scenario might
lead to another misunderstanding – that the EU’s political will is fad-
ing, so that the progression scenario is not being realized, rather the
regression scenario. Lots of reforms in Croatia, including not popular
ones, are labeled “European”. So perception is that Croatia is doing its
best, but the EU is just not willing to accept us. Such a perception, cou-
pled with the lack of a clear date of accession might slow down reform
implementation, in spite of the formal consensus around greater
Europeanisation. 
This simplified analysis of the complex process of the EU inte-
gration (which therefore should be viewed as tentative exercise) illus-
trates that it is quite simple to get from progression to secession. The
path from progression to secession is highly dependent on information
strategy and perception of the process of European integration.
Simplified domestic policy will play a crucial role in the process of
integration. 
Labeling unpopular reforms as European, which is not always
the truth, and simultaneously announcing EU membership as a Croatian
“strategic goal” gives confusing signals. Why should Croatia want to be
included into the EU while it creates costs? What is in it for Croatia,
and when will the integration process bring some benefits? 
It seems that no one is ready to say that Croatia needs reforms
anyway. Including unpopular ones. But it is politically easier to say that
Croatia needs them because the EU asked for them (or IMF, World
Bank and other “bad guys”). 
Still, it should be estimated how much membership can cost, and
which sequencing of reforms is needed. Croatia should know its nego-
tiating position – if EU membership is a Croatian strategic goal, is there
anything to negotiate? Also, it should be clear what price Croatia is
ready to pay for full membership (which could be distant). The issues
already raised include agriculture, fisheries and eco-zones. The border
with Slovenia has been recently mentioned (especially before the
Slovenian elections) in the context of Slovenian support for Croatia’s
integration into the EU. In the future new issues can arise, such as
national treatment in public procurement and granting concessions (e.g.
water but perhaps also gas and oil once Croatian oil company INA is
privatised more than 50%, which should be, according to the INA
Privatisation Act, upon accession to the EU).
Hence, although full membership is according to the so-far
available analyses economically the best option, Croatia should be open
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for “virtual membership” possibilities, such as political integration,
economic integration and decision shaping without full membership.
Some of the models and sectors for possible economic integra-
tion and institutional cooperation with the EU are given in Box 1.
Box 1 Possible models of virtual European Union membership
1. Economic dimension 
1.1. Trade and markets
Tariff free trade
Customs union
Single market (and avoiding hub and spoke relations)
1.2. Monetary regime
Semi-fixed parity with euro
Fixed exchange rate with euro, currency board
regime
Euro as parallel currency in private sector
Full euroisation
2. Institutional dimension
Political dialogue
Participation in decision-shaping, but not decision-
taking*
Implicit participation in decision making** 
Observer status in EU bodies, e.g. in Economic and
Social Committee, Committee of the Regions
Recognizing the authority of some EU institutions,
e.g. European Court of Justice
* Active observers, as 10 new members in pre-accession period.
** e. g. Council of Ministers: A member state chosen by the associated state or entity may
be mandated to speak on its behalf. In the voting of the Council of Ministers under the dou-
ble majority proposed by the Constitution, the mandated member state may cast the pop-
ulation vote of the associated state or entity separately. A representative of the associated
state or entity may attend as observer within the delegation of the mandated member state
in open legislative sessions European Parliament. Inclusion in a neighboring constituen-
cy of a member state (for a micro state/entity), or an observer or full member (where pop-
ulation reaches average constituency size). A Commissioner in the European Commission
will have relations with the associated states and entities in his portfolio of tasks.
Source: According to Emerson (2002; 2003)
As Box 1 shows, there are various options and their combina-
tions for participating in the EU. The benefits of virtual membership
include various sequencings of reforms. However, this implies that suf-
ficient analyses exist, so the best option can be chosen. Also, for a small
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country, virtual membership decreases costs, especially these in limit-
ed human capital. For instance, full euroisation would mean fully tak-
ing part in the euro area, but with no seat on the Governing Council of
the European Central Bank; and possibility for limited minting of euro
coins (like the Monaco euro). 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
After the last enlargement, the EU is for a small and neighbor-
ing country, such as Croatia, even more important than before. The
importance of other regional integrations has decreased. Therefore, full
EU membership is probably the best long-term solution. 
Croatia is likely to be included in the second wave of Eastern
EU enlargement, but that wave might be more distant than officially
expected by the Government. The time horizon of inclusion into the EU
does matter. Hence, alternative options should be considered for the
“pre-in” phase. 
Also, declaring full membership as a strategic goal and ultimate
objective can jeopardize the Croatian negotiating position and open
space for increased pressure from some member states. The decision
should be made: is there anything “more strategic” than the EU (such
as fisheries and oil in Norway) and how much are we ready to pay for
EU membership without knowing its timeframe? 
Hence, to strengthen Croatia’s negotiating position alternative,
“virtual” membership options should be taken into consideration, such
as participation in the internal market (such as European Economic
Area – EEA membership, like Norway, Iceland, Switzerland) and fol-
lowing the work of the EU institutions as active observers. Virtual
membership options might be in the short run economically more
viable than fast full membership.xxiv
Raising the public awareness that there is a life outside the EU
and that reforms are needed for successful transition and not because of
the EU might help in keeping the pace of reforms and enable the meet-
ing of membership criteria. Meeting the membership criteria should be
regarded as Europeanisation, and hence as a goal and not condition.xxv
The impact of economic integration into the enlarged EU (thor-
ough implementation of SAA) is expected to be greater than the impact
of integration into the EU-15. For the potential for exploiting the posi-
tive effects of simplified access to a large market grows with the growth
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of the market. This potential is greater in new members than in the EU-
15. However, the possibilities for exploiting this potential by Croatian
producers are limited by production structure and adaptability of firms
(i.e. by the ability to fulfil the second economic membership criterion).
In order to exploit the positive effects of integration, reforms are need-
ed. The reforms require the toleration of significant adjustment costs,
especially in the short run. The enlargement intensifies this effect, so
SAA implementation coupled with the impact of enlargement increas-
es the pressure for reforms. Reforms are transition-related, and their
result should bring benefits (enable sustainable growth). These reforms
would have been needed even if the EU had not enlarged, and if the
Croatia had not signed the SAA. Enlargement and establishment of a
free trade zone hence highlight the need for reforms and might speed
them up. In this context, the enlargement and the implementation of
SAA can be regarded as beneficial processes for the Croatian economy,
in spite of the fact that they create adjustment costs. 
Hence, recommendations can be summarized as follows: 
• examine the time frame for integration, i.e. how fast is it possible?
• identify alternative options for integration in the “pre-in” phase;
• define any strategic interests there might be that are unconnected with
membership in the EU;
• in sequencing reforms consider the possible timeframe for EU mem-
bership;
• raise public awareness that some of the EU-related reforms are also
transition-related (i.e. necessary anyway) and that by entering the EU
reforms (and related costs) do not stop.
i The first round of Eastern enlargement in this paper denotes the enlargement
process that includes 10 countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as Cyprus
and Malta. This means that Romania and Bulgaria are, in line with conclusions of
the Salonika European Council (2003) regarded as the part of the same round of
enlargement. 
ii Interim Agreement enables the application of the provisions of the Stabilization and
Association Agreement (SAA) that are under the competence of the Community
(such as establishment of a free trade zone). This enables gradual integration
towards the EU in the period before ratification process is finalized. 
iii More about membership criteria, see Boromisa (2004a:169-173).
iv This progress is monitored and evaluated regularly once a year by the European
Commission and its main findings are published in Regular Reports. In the period
after completing negotiations and before signing the Accession Treaty, candidates
were also monitored. The main findings were published in the Comprehensive
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Monitoring Report of the European Commission on the State of Preparedness for
EU Membership of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia (European Commission, 2004c).
v This is confirmed by conclusions of the European Councils in Copenhagen (2002),
Salonika (2003), and Brussels (2004). The Salonika Council (2003) stated that “the
pace of negotiations (with Bulgaria and Romania) will be maintained, and these
will continue on the same basis and principles that applied to the ten acceding states
with each candidate judged on its own merits. Building on significant progress
achieved, the Union supports Bulgaria and Romania in their efforts to achieve the
objective of concluding negotiations in 2004, and invites them to step up their
preparations on the ground. Discussions or agreement on future policy reforms, or
the new financial perspective, will neither impede the pursuit and conclusion of
accession negotiations nor be prejudged by the outcome of these negotiations.”The
Copenhagen Council (2002) recalled its decision from Helsinki (1999) that Turkey
is a “candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as
applied to the other candidate states”. When Croatia was given the candidate sta-
tus, the Council in Brussels stated following “The European Council… confirms
that the negotiations will be based on Croatia's own merits and that the pace of
accession will depend solely on Croatia's progress in meeting the requirements for
membership”. So the European Council confirms that the criteria will be the same,
but differences in wording might lead to conclusion that it acknowledges that the
EU is a moving target and that the timeframe does matter. 
vi This is evaluated upon functioning of the institutions designed to respect liberty,
democracy and human rights (parliament, executive, judiciary). They have to be
stable and guarantee the rule of law, i.e. they protect individual rights and freedom
in practice.
vii The European Commission evaluates the effectiveness of a market economy on the
basis of following: the equilibrium between supply and demand established by the
free interplay of market forces (prices and trade liberalization); absence of signifi-
cant barriers to market entry (establishment of new firms) and exit (bankruptcies,
liquidations); the legal system, including the regulation of property rights; macro-
economic stability achieved, including price stability, sustainable public finances
and external accounts; the existence of broad consensus about the essentials of eco-
nomic policy and sufficiently developed financial sector to channel savings towards
productive investments. 
viii This date corresponds with the planned date for finalizing preparations in Croatia.
Originally, it was targeted so as to catch up Bulgaria and Romania in the “next”
round of enlargement.
ix SAP conditions include conditions defined in the so-called “regional approach”,
i.e. conditions defined by the Council in its Conclusions of 29 April 1997 and 21-22
June 1999, the content of the final declaration of the Zagreb Summit of 24
November 2000 and Salonika agenda. They include co-operation with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), regional co-
operation and other related issues (such as refugee return, fight against corruption
etc).
x Such an approach can be explained by the fact that in the period before accession
significant progress was made in terms of negative integration, i.e. elimination of
customs duties and quantitative restrictions. Effects of other integration policies are
likely to be felt in a longer period. A similar approach is also used in numerous
studies, such as, Baldwin, Francois and Portes, 1997; Keuschingg and Kohler,
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1999; European Commission, 1997; Gros, Crum and Turmann, 2004. For summa-
rized findings of these approaches see Boromisa (2004b:14).
xi Integration into the EU means inclusion into the internal market, i.e. free movement
of goods, persons, services and capital. However, in this paper we examine only
product market integration. Removal of trade barriers means dismantling of exist-
ing barriers (e.g. tariffs, quotas, voluntary export restrictions) and harmonization
of policies (e.g. agriculture, competition, trade and industrial).
xii Negative integration denotes the removal of discrimination in economic rules and
policies, while positive integration refers to the transfer to common institutions. For
more see Pelkmans (1997).
xiii Ex ante estimation of potential economic effects of enlargement is dealt with under
the heading Economic impact of enlargement.
xiv This part of the paper relies on calculations in my Ph. D. thesis, while the data used
are mainly Eurostat, and to the lesser extent IMF and Croatian Bureau of Statistics.
If no source is explicitly stated, the default is Boromisa (2004b). 
xv One of the indices that can be used for measuring intra-industry trade (IIT) is the
Grubell-Lloyd index (GL) (more about IIT indices see Gullstrand, 2002). The GL
index, calculated on the two-digit level of combined nomenclature, for Croatia
towards EU-15 was 0.46, while towards the EU-25 is 0.5 (Boromisa, 2004b). IIT
towards the EU-25 is greater than towards EU-15. Volume and nature of goods
traded is one of the indices used to estimate readiness to meet economic member-
ship criteria. Hence, according to this index, after the enlargement Croatia meets
membership criteria better.
xvi Issue of the size of the next enlargement round is dealt with under heading Capacity
of enlarged European Union to absorb new members. 
xvii This concerns multilateralization of individual free trade agreements. 
xviii Similar wording is also in the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(COREPER, 2004), whose provisions follow the procedure established in the fifth
round of enlargement (Article I-57). 
xix By 35 I do not mean to imply that Kosovo will become sovereign state nor that
Serbia and Montenegro will create two different states. This number is just an illus-
tration of the possible total number of member states. It should be noted that
Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland may also apply for membership.
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and some Black Sea countries, as well as Russia may
also eventually become candidates. 
xx In order to minimize possible negative effects of the enlargement, the EU is foster-
ing regional integration in neighboring regions (Mediterranean countries, Russia,
Ukraine, CIS) and by doing so is intensifying competition on these markets and as
well in the EU market. Such a development, if Croatia does not intensify its efforts
for economic reform, can significantly jeopardize its competitiveness on these mar-
kets and EU market.
xxi Openness is defined as share of trade/proportion of GDP. Out of 17 sectors accord-
ing to national classification, five are subject to international trade and their share
in GDP has in the period 1995-2001 decreased from 31 to 28%. Percentage of
exports in GDP in the same period decreased from 49 to 24%. 
xxii This can be illustrated by unit export price defined as value of total exports (in
euros) over its quantity (in kg). 
xxiii We would not speculate on date of accession, since it depends on too many factors,
some of which are identified here. For the dates by which we consider Croatia is
likely to be evaluated by the European Commission as capable of meeting member-
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ship criteria see, for instance Boromisa (2002). It should also be noted that the risk
of delays in the ratification procedure rises with the number of the EU member
states (i.e. number of national parliaments that have to ratify the accession treaty). 
xxiv This statement relies on the fact that there is no obligation go contribute to the EU
budget before full membership. On the other hand, pre-accession funds (such as
TEMPUS, CARDS) should be open for participants from Croatia. This should be
analyzed in more detail.
xxv However, one should be aware that some of the necessary, but politically tough
decisions are “justified” as requirements for the EU. If other options are consid-
ered, new “excuses” for unpopular decisions such as decreasing public expenditure
are to be found. This might lead to the government losing popularity, which is not
the favorite option of (any) government. 
56
boromisa.qxd  22.3.2005  11:56  Page 56
LITERATURE
Baldwin, R. E., Francois, J. F. and Portes, R., 1997. “The costs and
benefits of eastern enlargement: the impact on the EU and central
Europe”. Economic Policy, (24), 125-177.
Bayar, A., 1998. European Enlargement to the East and its
Implications for the Mena Region. Paper prepared for the First
GTAP Annual Conference, June 8-10, 1998, Purdue University,
West Lafayette, Indiana, U.S.A.
Boromisa, A. and Mikiæ, M., 2003. “The European Union as determi-
nant of Croatian trade policy” in K. Ott, ed. Croatian accession to
the European Union: economic and legal challenges. Zagreb:
Institute of public finance : Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 139-157.
Boromisa, A., 2002. “Ukljuèivanje Hrvatske u EU: retorika ili real-
nost” in A. Ahec-Šonje, A. Babiæ and B. Bibiæ, eds. Odnos drave
i trišta na putu integracije Hrvatske u svjetske gospodarske tokove.
Zagreb: Ekonomija moderna : Matica Hrvatska : Friedrich
Naumann Stiftung, 211-233.
Boromisa, A., 2004a. “The readiness of the public administration for
European Union accession” in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian accession to the
European Union: institutional challenges. Zagreb: Institute of Pu-
blic Finance : Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 167-200.
Boromisa, A., 2004b. Prvi krug proširenja EU na drave srednje i
istoène Europe – moguæe posljedice na gospodarstvo Hrvatske, dis-
ertacija. Zagreb: Ekonomski fakultet.
Bulgarian Government, 2004. [online]. Available from: [http://-
www.government.bg/English/PressOffice/News/2004-06-
15/1936.html].
Cecchini, P. [et al.], 1988. The European challenge 1992. Aldershot:
Wildwood house.
COREPER, 2004. Provisional consolidated version of the draft Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe. Brussels, 25 June 2004, CIG
86/04. 
Council of the European Union, 1997. 2003rd council meeting. General
affairs. Conclusions. Luxembourg: Council of the European Union.
EBRD, 2004. Transition report. London: EBRD.
Emerson, M., 2002. “The wider Europe as the European Union’s
friendly monroe doctrine”. CEPS policy brief, No. 27, October.
Emerson, M., 2003. “The shaping of a policy framework for the Wider
Europe”. CEPS policy brief, No. 39, September 2003.
57
boromisa.qxd  22.3.2005  11:56  Page 57
Eurostat, 2004. Statistics in Focus, No 53. Brussels: European
Communities.
European Commission, 1996. “Economic evaluation of the internal
market”. European economy, (4). Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission, 1997. Agenda 2000. COM (1997) 2000 final,
Vol 1-2., EUR-OP. Brussels: European commission. 
European Commission, 2003a. Continuing enlargement. Strategy paper
and report of the European Commission on the progress towards
accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. COM(2003) 676 final.
European Commission, 2003b. Wider Europe- Neighbourhood: A
New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern
Neighbours, Communication to the Council and the European
Parliament. COM (2003) 104 final, 11.3.2003.
European Commission, 2004a. Croatia: Opinion on the application
of Croatia for membership of the European Union. COM (2004)
257 final, 20. 4. 2004.
European Commission, 2004b. Council Decision on the principles,
priorities and conditions contained in the European Partnership
with Croatia. COM (2004) 274 final, 20. 4. 2004. 
European Commission, 2004c. Comprehensive monitoring report of
the European Commission on the state of preparedness for EU
membership of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.
European Commission, 2004d. Commission Memo on Croatia’s can-
didate status [online]. Available from: [http://europa.eu.int/comm-
/external_relations/see/croatia/croatia04_14-06.pdf].
European Commission, 2004e. Communication from the commission
to the council and the european parliament. Recommendation of the
European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession.
COM(2004) 656 final, 6. 10. 2004.
European Council, 1993. Presidency Conclusions. Copehnagen:
European Council.
European Council, 1999. Presidency Conclusions [online]. Helsinki:
European Council. Available from: [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_-
Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm].
European Council, 2002. Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions.
Copenhagen: European Council. 
European Council, 2003. Presidency Conslusions [online]. Thesallona-
ki: European Council. Available from: [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms-
_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/76279.pdf].
58
boromisa.qxd  22.3.2005  11:56  Page 58
European Council, 2004a. Presidency Conclusions [online]. Brussels:
European Council. Available from: [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_-
Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/81742.pdf].
European Council, 2004b. Presidency Conclusions [online]. Brussels
European Council, 16 and 17 December 2004. Avaliable from:
[http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf].
Frandsen, S. E., Jensen, H. G., and Vanzetti, D. M., 1998.
Expanding “Fortress Europe” – Implications of European
Enlargement for Non-Member Regions. Kopenhagen: SJFI.
Gaisorek, M., Smith, A. and Venables, A., 1994. “Modelling the
effect of Central and East European trade on the European
Community”. European Economy, (6), 519-538.
Grimm, S., 2004. “European Development cooperation to 2010, What
scenario for the future?” [online]. EDC Briefing Papers, January
2004. Available from: [www.eadi.org/edc2010]. 
Gros, D., Crum, B. and Turmann, A., 2004. “Enlargement – A Process
rather than a Point in Time”. CEPS Policy Brief, No 51(April).
Gullstrand, J., 2002. „Does the measurment of Intra-Industry Trade
Matter?“. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv: Zeitschrift des Instituts für
Weltwirschaft an der Unive, (1368), 317-339.
IMF, 2000. “Republic of Croatia: Selected Issues and Statistical
Appendix”. IMF Country Report, No 00/22(March). Washington:
International Monetary Fund.
Kersan-Škabiæ, I., 2001. Utjecaj integracijskih procesa u Europi na
konkurentnost hrvatskog izvoza, disertacija. Zagreb: Ekonomski
fakultet.
Keuschnigg, C. and Kohler, W., 1999. Eastern Enlargement to the EU
Economic Costs and Benefits for the EU Present Members States?
The case of Austria. European Commission Study XiX/b1/9801.
Lejour, A., de Mooij, R. and Nahuis, R., 2001. “EU Enlargement:
economic implications for countries and industries”. CPB docu-
ment, No 11. Hague: Centraal Planbureau. 
Madareviæ, S., Šonje, V. and Jurlin, K., 1997. “Estimated Effects of
the Association Agreement on the Croatian Economy” in: V.
Samardija, ed. Economic Aspects of Croatia’s Integration into the
European Union. Zagreb: IMO-TEPSA, 35-76.
Pelkmans, J., 1997. European Integration, Methods and Economic
Analysis. New York: Addison Wesley Longman Limited.
Samardija, V., Stanièiæ, M. and Nikiæ, G. (eds.), 2000. Hrvatska i
EU: koristi i troškovi integriranja. Zagreb: Institut za meðunarodne
odnose.
59
boromisa.qxd  22.3.2005  11:56  Page 59
Schiff, M. and Winters, A., 1998. “Dynamics and politics in regional
integration arrangements: an introduction”. The World bank eco-
nomic review, 12 (2), 177-196.
Smith, A. and Venables, A., 1998. “Completing the internal market in
the European community: some industry simulations”. European
economic review, (32), 1401-1525.
Vlada RH, 2004. Nacionalni plan RH za pridruivanje Europskoj
uniji-2004.godina. Zagreb: Vlada Republike Hrvatske.
World Bank, 2004. 2004 world development indicators. Washington:
The World bank.
60
boromisa.qxd  22.3.2005  11:56  Page 60
